Based on the argument that Corporate Social Responsibility is not just a fashion but rather the future from another angle, this paper explores the link between corporate governance and corporate social responsibility in insurance. Although insurance industries have been less exposed to criticisms than other sectors, like any other business, they are subject to increasing societal scrutiny. After a short reconsideration of the corporate governance paradigms and mechanisms, the paper analyses the relevance of corporate social responsibility and corporate governance for the insurance sector. It explores its positive and negative externalities and its role as institutional investor. The paper also provides policy recommendations for mainstreaming corporate social responsibility within the sector.
Introduction
Corporate Social Responsibility: yet more hype without a sustainable future, or the future from another angle?
Time and time again, with the regularity of a clock, businessmen and management professors find themselves assailed by new business fashions, pretending to hold the absolute and definitive key to strategy and thus to the future of the company. Kenneth Clark pointed to the danger of this when he stated that "Confident articles on the future seem to me, intellectually, the most disreputable of all forms of public utterance" (quoted in Barrow [1998] ). It would be understandable to certain readers of this article to reject the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility as being just another business fashion, a new religion or a new ideology, which in practice has nothing to offer; understandable, but wrong, at least in the opinion of this article's authors [ Van den Berghe. & Verbeke, 2001 ].
The present contribution represents a reconnoitring of the future of business conduct and governance. To avoid provoking the above criticism of Kenneth Clark, however, we would just say that, in such an exercise, posing the right questions (and particularly continuing to pose them) is more important than giving answers, which will necessarily change anyway over the years. Indeed, anyone attempting to promote his or her piece of the truth as the entire truth destroys its value.
Becoming involved in Corporate Social Responsibility can be seen as a passionate expression of faith. While disclaiming a passionate involvement, we aim to analyse the contextual factors that could lead to Corporate Social Responsibility simply being a sensible strategic option in the chaotic world we live in, or at least in a number of industries closely connected with the knowledge society. Before doing so, we have to point to the link between Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Corporate Governance in the insurance sector.
Approach and hypothesis of this contribution
Faced with the increasing pressure for Corporate Social Responsibility and a broader role of business in society, it is no longer sufficient for a 'responsible firm' to live by the law and focus on financial profit to create value for shareholders. This is also true for the financial and insurance sector. However, traditional corporate governance as well as traditional management tools and accounting principles do not allow corporate social responsibility to be managed efficiently and effectively. This is the central thesis we want to discuss in this article.
The first section of the paper highlights the increasing focus on the role of business in society and its effects on corporate governance. The concept of CSR is closely allied to that of governance. Both CSR and corporate governance have to do with the direction of companies and with the translation of that into corporate strategy.
The second section addresses the relevance of Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate
Governance for the insurance sector. In this section, we investigate first the sectors' positive and negative externalities, secondly its role as institutional investors and thirdly we suggest some policy recommendations in order to mainstream CSR and Corporate Governance within the insurance industries. The concluding section presents some reflections and ideas for further research.
Increased focus on the role of business in society and its effects on corporate governance

Business conduct is under growing scrutiny and paradigms are changing
Business conduct is under growing scrutiny. There is increasing focus on the role of 'business in society' which shows a manifestation of change: business firms should have a 'responsible' attitude and behaviour, wherever they operate. This goes to the heart of CSR, which presumes a conscious search for a balance, beyond short-term efficiency, in order to achieve long-term, sustainable success, based on a balanced respect for the interest of all parties involved in the company. Paradigms are changing. Companies are facing a new invisible hand [Huysse, 1999] , that is non market forces exerted by NGOs, media, trade unions, and others. This is a powerful force that reigns the business world and definitely opened-up the black box of board and management trade-offs and decision-making. Stimulated and influenced by this new invisible hand, market parties also start to consider CSR and good corporate governance as the prerequisite for sustainable growth and welfare within a globalising business environment.
Faced with the combined forces of the new invisible hand and the alerted market parties, the business world can no longer ignore its increased societal accountability as well as its externalities [Van den Berghe and Carchon, 2003] . Externalities are the side-effects of corporate activities on society. They can be either positive (economies) or negative (diseconomies). In this respect traditional corporate governance and management paradigms need a thorough reconsideration.
The need for a new corporate governance paradigm and mechanisms
The recent wave of corporate scandals in the United States (Enron, Worldcom, Tyco, etc.) and in Europe (Parmalat, Ahold, Vivendi, Lernout & Hauspie, etc.) has brought lots of attention to corporate governance.
Corporate governance has been defined by Sir Adrian Cadbury as the direction and control of the company. In philosophic terms, it has to do with transparency, with accountability (in the sense that our errors can be laid to our score) and with honesty. In methodological terms, it has to do with the necessity of achieving greater certainty in the correctness of decisions being taken and to achieving that via a number of measures (structures, processes, checks and balances, correct monitoring, etc.). Proper governance will thus probably lead to the situation where, in a board of directors, various strands of interest (family shareholders, institutional investors, management and the common good) may and ought to be brought forward in discussion, but where ultimately resolutions have to be taken (by all) in the interest of the company, an interest which all members of that board are required to serve. underlying paradigms need to be redefined or questioned. First, there is a need to redefine the role of the firm from the perspective of business in society and thereby to integrate more modern theories of the firm and alternative theories such as the resource-based view, the knowledge-based view, the networkers and the communitarians view (for more detailed information see Van den Berghe and carchon [2003] and Van den Berghe et al. [2002] ).
Second, one of the big challenges for corporate governance theories is to shift from the traditional principal-agent theory to the management of complex principal-agent relationships to take the many stakeholders interests into consideration. There is a need to integrate complex sets of relationships and their potential conflicts of interest and develop governance mechanisms to manage them effectively and efficiently. Third, the pure shareholder thinking as primary goal of corporations needs to be revised towards sustainable value creation [George, 2001; Atkinson et al. 1997] . And finally, the question is whether there is a convergence to the dominant firm logic. fixing and collusion. Moreover, the insurance sector, which was heavily invested in stocks after the bull market of the nineties, was greatly hurt by the stock exchange debacle, that followed these corporate collapses.
The insurance sector presents some specific characteristics which make it an interesting case for applying the analysis of CSR and corporate governance. In the following section we will explore the positive and negative externalities of the insurance industry, its role as institutional investor and we will suggest some policy recommendations in order to mainstream modern concepts of CSR and Corporate Governance within the insurance industries.
Sectoral relevance given its potential for specific positive externalities
Given the huge potential for positive externalities, embedded in the insurance and financial services sector, it is clear that these firms perform a far greater role in society than their pure micro-economic market role. From a CSR-perspective this supposes that governments and civil society should foster the development of these sectors in order to optimise societal value.
It is still open for discussion whether these positive elements are sufficiently taken into consideration or whether the potential for negative externalities has overwhelmed the public perception.
3.1.1. Management of pure risks: how financial institutions and insurers can help to solve societal problems
From a conceptual perspective, we have proven the positive externalities created by the insurance and financial services industry [Van den Berghe, 1981] . In fact, by applying the law of large numbers, insurance companies transform individual insecurity into transferable risk and by doing so, they create a higher level of assurance and stimulate economic risk taking.
Moreover, insurance is built on a solidarity mechanism between fortunate and unfortunate insured customers. In order to make insurance 'affordable' to persons and organisations with higher risks, governments can even allow insurers to build-in elements of obligatory systems of solidarity.
One of the ways CSR could translate into better performance at corporate as well as at societal level, is through a more efficient and more effective risk management. The potential for positive externalities can clearly be documented by referring to some recent examples. Although it is a rather negative approach, financial institutions were forced to consider environmental aspects in their business.
The liability issue is certainly an imperative consideration to be taken up by financial institutions and insurers. They have an important role of assessing risks, estimating ways to manage these risks and calculate the return of possible risk management routes. The insurance industry can help to remediate environmental damage and provide a mechanism to internalise environmental and social externalities by putting a price on environmental and social risks.
Because it is desirable to prevent damage rather than remediate it, insurers need to send clear market signals to accurately price risks and reward socially and environmentally well- Since liability has been clearly strengthened through legislation as well as through civil society, this also raises new challenges for corporate risk managers. If they want to gain access to bank finance or insurance at reasonable cost, they will need to improve their overall social and environmental performance.
Another relevant CSR-issue for the insurance industry is climate change. Recent apparent instability in the weather and a succession of natural catastrophes have made it more difficult for insurers to calculate risks. The insurance industry already took some initiatives such as the development of financial tools to help business off-load some of its environmental risks, and the drafting by insurers of a U.N. charter on sustainable development. Leading insurers such as Munich Re and Swiss Re are taking the idea of global warming very seriously. Directors are responsible for insuring that an effective system of risk management is installed.
This results in the fact that the core business of insurers and financial service providers becomes all of a sudden one of the focal points of attention of boards and top management.
A positive side-effect of the instrumental role insurance and financial services firms are playing, could well be that they get more responsibility in judging the governance and risk profile of business firms. Regulations like Sarbanes-Oxley and the Basle II put indeed quite some additional responsibilities on the shoulders of insurers and bankers. The increased obligations on risk management and on monitoring of corporate governance, installed by Sarbanes-Oxley, will necessitate that insurers take a closer look at these elements before accepting to take over some of the business risk. In buying insurance or investment product s, trust in the service provider is of enormous importance. In life insurance and pensions, customers should have the trust that the company they pay yearly premiums to, will still be around after 30 or 40 years and be able to pay them back all of their saving money. In trusting one's money, savings or investments to financial service providers, a customer must have the necessary guarantees of solvency and liquidity at all times. Trust in the financial system is therefore of utmost importance for the stability of the economy; hence the serious interference of governments to regulate these activities.
Special attention for the potential of negative externalities
Unfortunately for the insurance and financial service providers, their sectoral specificities not only hold the potential for positive externalities. On the contrary, also important negative externalities can occur. These have probably gained far more public attention (recently) than their positive side-effects.
The danger of false expectations and miss-selling
Sometimes, customers of insurance and financial service providers suffer from ill-advised products, overselling or even miss-selling. This has not only given rise to numerous customer complaints, but also to outright scandals. In some cases it is clear that hard selling techniques and unfair distribution practices are at the heart of the problem. In other cases it is more the complex nature of modern financial services that gives rise to the potential for miss-selling.
The more developed capital markets become, the more financial products proliferate in all formats and shapes. These sophisticated products can pose complex challenges for advisors as well as for customers to choose the correct product that best fits the customers' specific needs.
Moreover, the pricing of these products can become rather intransparent. This certainly holds for a great deal of investment products. That the potential for miss-selling is considerable has recently been shown in many countries:
 Great negative publicity was given to the pension and mortgage miss-selling in the UK.
 Another example of negative externalities was experienced by Dexia, a Belgian-French financial conglomerate. They suffered a huge reputation loss as well as numerous court cases in relation to the stock-lease products, developed by the investment company they bought from the Dutch insurer Aegon.
 In the US, numerous financial services providers have been condemned by the SEC for incorrect cost and investment allocations in their mutual funds in the US.
That the number of these complaints and court cases has drastically increased the last couple of years is probably not due, in the first place, to an enormous deterioration of the ethical stance of insurance and financial services firm. A far more important driver is to be found in the effects of the new invisible hand. The Internet lowered the barrier for product comparisons, while consumer groups and frustrated customers have made large-scale use of the media to echo their complaints publicly.
The silent revolution in shifting the risk burden back to the customer
Numerous examples of actual and future shifting of the risk burden, back to the customer, can be observed in the insurance world. This silent evolution could well become a boomerang if not well addressed and managed in a responsible way.
The more open the competition becomes and the more individualism reigns, the less viable is it to build large-scale solidarity into insurance products. In such environment, risk pricing becomes more and more individualised. For the good risks, this is a great evolution, but for the higher end of the risk spectrum insurance cover becomes far more expensive if not outright unaffordable. This has been overwhelmingly clear in the tough competitive battle in markets like auto-insurance. In some countries, insurers have been blamed for reckless pricing on the back of the more problematic risk groups. This in itself is a proof of the externalities and their devastating potential effects on this type of business.
From a CSR-perspective, a future time-bomb is ticking under the pension system. With the growing longevity, the funding of pensions is increasingly under attack. Governments, business firms as well as insurers and pension funds try to switch gradually from a definedbenefits to a defined-contribution system. The enormous impact of this shift is however not sufficiently explained and the potential risks involved, for the future generations of pensioners, is certainly not clear at all. In an era of increased accountability and scrutiny of the business world by civil society, it is in the interest of the service providers to invest more time and effort in improving the understanding of the great consequences of this shift.
Another important step could be to offer sufficient transparency and choices, certainly for those that can not or do not want to carry this risk burden themselves.
From dominant firm logic to fair value accounting: is there still a future for long-term risk spreading?
The focus on the dominant firm logic has driven the accounting principles into the direction of fair value accounting. In a listed company with dispersed shareholders the market is finally the best monitor. However market monitoring supposes very detailed disclosure, in order to make external monitoring feasible. Moreover in a stock market where the engine is made up of sharetraders and daytraders disclosure of fair market value is of tremendous importance.
Although these recipes mainly hold for that dominant firm logic, as in any other field of corporate governance, all other types of firms are greatly affected too. In the EU the IAS accounting regime will hold for all listed companies that have to publish consolidated annual accounts, including banks and insurance companies.
Without going into the detailed effects of this new accounting regime, it is necessary from the perspective of externalities to point to the negative effects this fair value accounting could have for the core business of insurance. Given the inversion of the exploitation cycle, the need for risk spreading from a time as well as from a customer perspective, insurers need to build substantial technical provisions. Such long-term stability buffers are essential for smoothly performing their core function. Indeed, insurance is embedded in uncertainties as to the timing, frequency and amounts of claims to be paid. This is in fundamental contrast with the short-term focus of fair value accounting. Although solutions can be found in the capital market to shift the burden away from insurers, it remains to be seen whether this shift is not endangering the mere existence of the insurance transfer function.
Specific Corporate Social Responsibility-and Corporate Governance relevance, given the role as institutional investor
Although to a different degree, all insurance companies, pension funds, investment funds, credit institutions, etc. perform a role as 'institutional investor. In respect to corporate governance as well as to CSR, the institutional investors can perform an important role.
The potential role in shareholder engagement
Many countries are supervising the investment behaviour of institutional investors in as far as it influences their solvency. Some go one step further, by making them accountable for effectively voting in shareholders' meetings. If accountable for voting behaviour, this mainly focuses on disciplinary mechanisms to improve shareholder return. However, institutional investors themselves are under increased scrutiny from society in two directions: they are increasingly questioned about their own corporate governance while pressure is also mounting to enlarge their accountability for checking also the CSR-policies of firms. Indeed, insurance companies and pension funds are stewards of their customers or members' money, and as such, they have a (very) powerful position. Their own corporate governance and CSR is increasingly being questioned:
"…are these interventionist owners of shares, who may simply be stewards of pension fund investments, empowered to act in disregard of employee considerations?
…highly visible yet frequently anonymous, with notable exceptions, creators of mergers and acquisitions, financial engineers, asset strippers, institutions, whom I've already argued often, are but the stewards of pension fund investments masquerading as owners"
[Denis Cassidy, 2001 ].
As the recent literature points out the interest of institutional investors in CSR is increasing [Hummels and Timmer, 2003; Coles and Green, 2002; Bayon, 2001; Gribben and Faruk, 2004] . But also inter-governmental organisations such as the European Commission or the U.N. and governmental organisations are exerting pressures on financial institutions and insurance to engage in CSR through their powerful position as investors.
According to Clark and Hebb [2003] 2004] . The dominant claim is that Socially Responsible Investment provides higher financial returns than regular funds [Luther,et al., 1992; Mallin et al., 1995; Snyder et al., 1993; SIF, 1998; Bauer et al, 2002] . A number of studies show inconclusive results either because of a lack of significant statistical difference between the returns of ethically screened and unscreened universes [Diltz, 1995; Sauer, 1997] or because of sector and style biases [Louche, 2001; Pava and Krausz, 1996] . Very few studies conclude that ethical funds underperform [Mueller, 1991] .
As long as the positive impact of , environmental and ethical issues on portfolio performance is not shown, institutional investors will remain reticent to Socially Responsible Investment.
A positive relationship is a prerequisite for Socially Responsible Investment to become a logical development. However, institutional investors are recognising very slowly that social and environmental standards are appropriate concerns in order to ensure long-term returns and therefore fulfil rather than detract from their fiduciary duty.
Linking Socially Responsible Investments and Corporate Governance
Recently Corporate Governance is becoming an important issue among institutional investors.
The Parmalat and Enron scandals proved to the world that stakeholders can suffer from abuse by company management, as well as from misguided self-interest of influential shareholders.
Moreover research showed that good corporate governance is positively linked to financial returns. Initially the scientific research was directed mainly towards the relationship between one or more corporate governance characteristics and the share price, valuation and earnings or the company. Positive relationships were found [Bauer and Gunster, 2003; Millstein and MacAvoy, 1998 ]. Other more comprehensive studies, such as Gompers et al. [2003] As argued Clark and Hebb [2003] , institutional investors have a role to play in the monitoring of firm management behaviour as they "engage directly with the firm through corporate governance over longer time periods" and "began making linkages between the underlying fundamentals of the firm, its day-to-day decision-making process and long-term shareholder wealth". He also expects a greater awareness of the impact of corporate governance on longterm value after scandals such as Enron and WorldCom. Through engagement they will improve transparency and disclosure of companies.
Some suggestions for developing a policy to mainstream Corporate
Social Responsibility and Corporate Governance in the financial and insurance sector 3.4.1. Greater emphasis on the management of negative externalities
Compliance with customer needs
Given the complexities involved with financial planning and risk management, an average customer is certainly not able to come up with a clear view on what his or her actual needs are and/or his or her future interests will be. With a more critical customer base and a more demanding society the insurance and financial services sector can no longer allow itself to stick to a push-marketing and a cross-selling attitude. The service providers need to invest more time and effort into a better understanding of the specific needs of the customer. In the context of the new invisible hand, too much focus on short-term profit at the cost of long-term sustainability can easily lead to a kind of a boomerang-effect. Building a corporate culture that rewards integrity will probably be a far better instrument than any strict regulation.
Educative efforts towards (potential) customers
Customers as well as employees and distribution representatives need a far better understanding of the complex characteristics of modern insurance and financial services products. Risk identification, risk transfer and solidarity, investment options and cost elements all deserve far more attention. But the most difficult challenge will be to make the transfer from mere product information over financial education to good financial advice. From a governance, as well as a CSR perspective, insurers, pension funds and other institutional investors will increasingly be placed before their responsibilities as 'external' monitors of good corporate behaviour. The Combined Code on Corporate Governance has explicitly given the institutional investors the duty to perform a tough monitoring of the firms they invest in. After the Dutch Tabaksblat code did the same, there is now a Dutch initiative to install a special corporate governance commission to develop specific recommendations for the accountability of institutional investors. Faced with the potential for conflicts of interest, some of these service providers will turn to specialist shareholder services for outsourcing this important duty. However with or without outsourcing, they will finally be held responsible for making full use of their potential for stimulating positive externalities also on this level.
In a recent speech at the London seminar of the International Insurance Society, the British Financial Services Authority explicitly stated their reliance on corporate governance mechanisms of insurers as a corner stone for its regulatory approach.
Conclusion
From a societal perspective, the duties and responsibilities placed on the enterprise have increased drastically the last couple of years. The more the business world becomes a prominent economic force, the more society expects firms to operate in a responsible way. In essence a responsible firm takes into consideration all direct and indirect external effects of its operation. By doing so, the business world "confirms" that the pure market theory as developed by neo-classicals and contractarians is incomplete in as far as they are ignoring these externalities.
As this paper shows, corporate governance and corporate social responsibility are highly relevant for the financial and insurance sector. As any other sector of activity, financial institutions and insurers are subject to tougher societal scrutiny. Its specific core business, its environment and its important potential for positive and negative externalities makes it an interesting sector for applying the analysis of CSR and corporate governance.
Financial institutions and especially insurers can play an important role as evaluator of risk management and estimating risk management returns as well as institutional investors.
Transparency and CSR can become additional valued properties for the financial institutions and insurers. This is in line with the view of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) who argues that the pursuit of sustainable development makes the organisations "[…]more resilient to shocks, nimble in a fast-changing world, […] , and more at ease with regulators" [Holliday Jr. et al, 2002] . The increasing level of CSR with regards to investment strategy goes hand in hand with risk management and integration of CSR in organisation structure [Moskowitz, 1972] . The investment policy must evolve hand in hand with risk management and must support the evolution of Socially Responsible Investment and environmental, social and ethical considerations.
A full-fledged Socially Responsible Investment strategy as investment strategy is maybe a too far reaching approach. However we believe that an engagement strategy may be a valuable strategy to stimulate CSR as it would provide financial institutions and insurers a direct contact with companies, including communication with senior management and board members about performance, corporate governance and other matters affecting shareholders'
interests, including CSR. Insurance, as institutional investors, should use their voting rights.
For this purpose, it would be useful to write a policy document on the exercising of proxy votes as well as communicate to the clients the voting activities in order to improve transparency.
The paper raised a number of issues that need to be further researched. First of all, financial services firms and insurance companies have to develop a better understanding of their numerous positive and negative externalities. However, assessment is only the first step in a comprehensive management of these externalities. Given the increasing attention for risk management and its relevance to both corporate governance and CSR, special attention must be given to build on the societal role the financial sector can play in this respect. In order to play its role of evaluator, the financial and insurance sector need better tools to assess social and environmental risks. 
